From ssf6 at cornell.edu Sun Nov 1 21:22:47 2009 From: ssf6 at cornell.edu (ssf6@cornell.edu) Date: Mon Nov 2 11:56:11 2009 Subject: [liibulletin] LII Supreme Court Bulletin, Nov. 2 (4 previews) Message-ID: <200911020222.nA22Mlbw007483@hula.law.cornell.edu> LII Supreme Court Bulletin: Oral Argument Previews Become a sponsor Sponsor the LIIBULLETIN for 2009-2010 www.law.cornell.edu ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Prepared by the LIIBULLETIN editorial board ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bilski v. Kappos (08-964) Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Oct. 30, 2008) PATENT LAW, PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION TEST In 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office denied Bernard Bilski's patent application for a method of hedging risk in commodities trading. Affirming the rejection on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that a process must be tied to a particular machine or transform an article into a different state to be patentable. The Supreme Court will consider the validity of the machine-or-transformation test for patentability. This case will have implications for the validity of current process patents as well as the availability of future patent protection for business methods. If the court decides that business-methods are not patentable, this would invalidate numerous patents and may curb innovation in the biotechnology and software industry. If, however, the court overturns the machine-or-transformation test and declares that Bilski?s idea is patent-eligible, expensive litigation may continue and uncertainty will mount regarding business-method patents. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Graham v. Florida (08-7412); Sullivan v. Florida (08-7621) Oral argument: November 9, 2009 Appealed from: Florida First District Court of Appeal (/Graham v. Florida/, Apr. 10, 2008; /Sullivan v. Florida/, June 17, 2008) EIGHTH AMENDMENT, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, JUVENILE Terrance Jamal Graham ("Graham") committed an armed burglary when he was sixteen years old. Joe Harris Sullivan committed sexual battery when he was thirteen years old. Both men are currently serving life sentences in the State of Florida ("Florida") with no possibility of parole. Graham and Sullivan each argue that sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Florida counters that such sentences are not constitutionally barred and reflect a state's considered legislative response to the growing problem of juvenile crime. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether juveniles may be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing non-homicide offenses. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Hertz Corp. v. Friend (08-1107) Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 30, 2008) DIVERSITY JURISDICTION, CITIZENSHIP OF CORPORATIONS Though federal courts are generally only able to hear claims arising under federal law, Congress gives them the power to exercise so called ?diversity jurisdiction? over any state law civil claim between citizens of different states. When a multistate corporation seeks relief in federal court on the basis of a so-called diversity action, courts wrestle with exactly what factors they should look to in determining the corporation?s citizenship. Here, a group of California citizens sued Hertz Corporation in California state court alleging violations of California?s state labor laws. Hertz sought to remove the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit concluded Hertz was a California citizen and denied removal jurisdiction. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to lay out a specific test for determining corporate citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Kucana v. Holder (08-911) Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (July 7, 2008) IMMIGRATION, JUDICIAL REVIEW, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Agron Kucana, an Albanian immigrant, missed his immigration hearing and, /in absentia/, was ordered to be removed/. /The Board of Immigration Appeals (the ?Board?) denied Kucana's motion to reopen his case. Kucana appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the Board?s decision was not subject to judicial review. In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. ? 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) specifies that certain matters subject to the Attorney General?s discretion are not subject to judicial review. The dispute in this case centers on the scope and proper interpretation of the statute ? in particular, on whether it allows judicial review of decisions not to reopen cases, or whether these decisions are outside the realm of judicial review, because they are the subject to the Attorney General?s discretion. The outcome of this case will determine the ability of immigrants to challenge denials of their motions to reopen through the regular judicial process. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: http://ruckus.law.cornell.edu/pipermail/liibulletin/attachments/20091101/be147f24/attachment.html From ssf6 at cornell.edu Mon Nov 23 14:01:53 2009 From: ssf6 at cornell.edu (ssf6@cornell.edu) Date: Mon Nov 23 13:04:37 2009 Subject: [liibulletin] LII Supreme Court Bulletin, Nov. 23 (5 previews) Message-ID: <200911231901.nANJ1qYe012918@hula.law.cornell.edu> LII Supreme Court Bulletin: Oral Argument Previews Become a sponsor Sponsor the LIIBULLETIN for 2009-2010 www.law.cornell.edu ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Prepared by the LIIBULLETIN editorial board ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Graham County Soil v. United States (08-304) Oral argument: Nov. 30, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 9, 2008) *FALSE CLAIMS ACT, QUI TAM, RELATOR, SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION* Respondent, the United States /ex rel. / Karen Wilson ("Wilson"), brought a /qui tam / action against two North Carolinian counties, Graham and Cherokee (collectively the ?Counties?), for allegedly filing fraudulent reimbursement claims with the federal government. The Counties argue that, under the False Claims Act , no court has jurisdiction over Wilson's suit, because the State of North Carolina had previously publicly disclosed the information on which Wilson relies in her suit. Wilson counters that the False Claims Act?s public disclosure bar refers only to federal reports, audits, and investigations. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether, under the False Claims Act, a publicly disclosed state audit and investigation may preclude jurisdiction over a /qui tam/ action. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds (08-905) Oral argument: Nov. 30, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Sept. 9, 2008) *SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SCIENTER, Section 10(b)* Under* *28 U.S.C. ? 1658(b) , a plaintiff must file a claim alleging violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 no later than two years after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation. The Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that the two-year period of limitations begins when the plaintiff had, or should have had knowledge of the facts constituting the violation. What is at issue in this case is whether knowledge that defendant acted with the intent to deceive is a fact constituting the violation for purposes of triggering the two-year period of limitation. The Supreme Court?s decision will resolve this question of statutory interpretation and, in so doing, will determine the delicate balance between allowing plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and providing certainty and repose to potential securities fraud defendants. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States (08-1119); United States v. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz (08-1225) Oral argument: Dec. 1, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Sept. 4, 2008) *BANKRUPTCY, FIRST AMENDMENT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, DUE PROCESS* This case concerns the application and constitutionality of three Bankruptcy Code provisions applicable to debt relief agencies: 11 U.S.C. ?? 526(a), 528(a)(4), and 528(b)(2)(B). Minnesota law firm Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. claims exemption from the provisions, arguing that an attorney is not a ?debt relief agency.? Furthermore, it claims that 11 U.S.C. ? 526(a), which prevents a ?debt relief agency? from counseling a client to incur additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy, is an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction of free speech. Finally, Milavetz argues that 11 U.S.C. ?? 528(a)(4) and 528(b)(2)(B), which require a ?debt relief agency? to make certain disclosures in their advertisements, violate the First Amendment. The United States argues that the statutes apply to attorneys and that they are reasonable and specific restrictions on speech. This case?s outcome will potentially affect bankruptcy laws, disclosure laws, and the legal advice that a lawyer may provide a client. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dept. of Envt?l Protection (08-1151) Oral argument: Dec. 2, 2009 Appealed from: Florida Supreme Court (Sept. 29, 2008) *TAKINGS CLAUSE, JUDICIAL TAKINGS, ACCRETION, COASTAL PROPERTY, FEDERALISM* In order to combat beach erosion, the Florida Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act. The act authorized local municipalities to restore the coastline by adding sand, creating a temporary buffer against erosion. Petitioner Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (?SBR?) claims that Respondents Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al. (?Florida?) misused the statute in order to unconstitutionally appropriate private beaches for public use without just compensation. SBR alleges that the Florida Supreme Court violated the due process and takings clauses by suddenly and unpredictably changing state substantive law to deprive SBR of its private property without compensation. SBR asks the court, for the first time, to explicitly articulate a doctrine of ?judicial takings? in order to address the growing problem of state judiciaries redefining property rights out of existence so that states can avoid compensating property owners. Florida argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should avoid interfering in state court interpretation of state law out of respect for federalism. Florida contends that, even if there were a situation where a doctrine of judicial takings should be imposed, this is not one of them, because the Florida Supreme Court properly followed common law precedent. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa (08-1134) Oral argument: Dec. 1, 2009 Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec. 10, 2008) *BANKRUPTCY, STUDENT LOANS, CHAPTER 13, DISCHARGE, RES JUDICATA, DUE PROCESS* Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed in his Chapter 13 reorganization plan that he would repay $13,250 in student loans to United Student Aid Funds (?Funds?). Although Funds claimed they were owed an additional $4,582.15, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona confirmed Espinosa's plan as proposed, and Funds did not object to the confirmed plan. Espinosa repaid all debts according to the Chapter 13 plan. Funds subsequently began to intercept Espinosa's income tax refunds, claiming that Espinosa had improperly discharged his student loans, because Espinosa had not initiated a statutorily required adversary proceeding to determine whether repayment of the student loans would constitute an "undue hardship." While the U.S. District Court of Arizona held that Espinosa had violated Funds' due process interests by failing to initiate an adversary proceeding and serve a complaint and summons upon Funds according to the statutory procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and Funds now appeals. The Supreme Court ?s decision in this case will determine how student loans and other debts are collected in bankruptcy and will affect the overall relationship between debtors and creditors in America. continues... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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